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BOOK REVIEWS 
Theism, Atheism, and Big Bang Cosmology, by William Lane Craig and 
Quentin Smith. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993. Pp. x and 342. $45.00 (Cloth) 
GRAHAM OPPY, Australian National University 
Recent scientific research into the cosmological origins of the universe has 
prompted a flood of philosophical speculations about the consequences of 
that research for views which invoke supernatural causes for the existence 
of the universe. Much of this speculation has come from people whose pri-
mary training is not philosophical; in particular, much of it has come from 
the same physicists who are engaged in the scientific research in question. 
Moreover, much of the scientific research in question is inseparably bound 
up with certain kinds of speculations which not-too-distant previous gener-
ations would have considered to be solely the province of philosophers. A 
brief glance at the "Popular Science" section of any reasonable bookshop 
will confirm that not only Stephen Hawking, Paul Davies, Roger Penrose, 
John Barrow, Frank Tipler, Joseph Silk, Steven Weinberg, John Gribbin and 
Freeman Dyson, but many other physicists and journalists with consider-
able training in physics have turned their attention to these kinds of specu-
lations, with varying degrees of success. 
Difficulties in assessing these cosmological speculations spring from two 
principle sources, viz. (i) the mathematical and physical complexities of the 
physical theories; and (li) the interpretative problems which arise once the 
mathematical and physical details are fixed. For those unversed in differen-
tial geometry-and other relevant branches of mathematics--even the mere 
precise formulation of the physical theories remains out of reach; yet for 
those who have mastered the mathematics and physics, there remain 
numerous subtle questions about the bearings of the physical evidence on 
the resulting theories, and about the consequences of the theories for theo-
logical questions. It seems clear the professional philosophers should be 
able to playa useful role in the assessment of the interpretative questions-
and, in particular, that skills developed in the assessment of related prob-
lems in other areas should be transferable-but it is unclear what level of 
mathematical and physical expertise is required. 
Short of learning all of the relevant mathematics and physics, several 
courses are open to philosophers. One possibility is to rely on the descrip-
tive interpretations which physicists give of their theories in their popular 
books. Another possibility is to further rely on the semi-technical descrip-
tive interpretations which occur in the popular scientific journals: Science, 
Nature, Scientific American, New Scientist, etc. A third possibility is to further 
make use of the less theoretical scientific journals-e.g. the astrophysical 
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journals-in which the relevant physical data is collected and described. A 
fourth possibility is further to learn some of the relevant mathematics and 
physics, e.g. via standard texts in the fields: introductions to differential 
geometry and tensor analysis on manifolds, general relativity and gravita-
tion, quantum mechanics, quantum electrodynamics, etc. And a fifth possi-
bility is further to skim the technical physical journals with an eye to learn-
ing something from the descriptive pronouncements-about the assump-
tions required for, or the significance of, technical results-which occur in 
these articles. It does not seem unreasonable to suppose that the adoption of 
some or all of these techniques-perhaps in conjunction with discussion 
with physicists and mathematicians-will enable philosophers to make a 
useful contribution to the ongoing debate. 
In Theism, Atheism And Big Bang Cosmology, William Lane Craig and 
Quentin Smith-two philosophers who have pursued all of the strategies 
just mentioned-daim to have begun philosophical debate about Big Bang 
cosmology; and they hope that readers will leave the book with "an 
increased appreciation of the profound issues involved in .. a theistic or 
atheistic interpretation of Big Bang cosmology" (vii). I think that the debate 
had already well and truly begun; but, as just noted, I agree with them that 
there is room for philosophers to make an important contribution to an 
appreciation of the issues involved. Whether their book makes the right 
kind of contribution remains to be determined. 
The book is composed mainly of previously published pieces-some 
unchanged: Craig's "Theism And Big Bang Cosmology" (VIII) and '''What 
Place, Then, For A Creator?': Hawking On God And Creation" (XI), and 
Smith's "Infinity And The Past" (II); some abridged: an annotated excerpt 
from Craig's The Kalam Cosmological Argument (I), Craig's "Time And 
Infinity" (III), and Smith' s "Atheism, Theism And Big Bang Cosmology" 
(VII); and some adapted and expanded: Craig's" A Criticism Of The 
Cosmological Argument For God's Non-Existence" (X) and Smith's "The 
Uncaused Beginning Of The Universe" (IV)-and pieces forthcoming at the 
time of publication-Craig's "The Caused Beginning Of The Universe" (V) 
(slightly altered when it appeared) and Smith's "Did The Big Bang Have A 
Cause?" (VI). Apart from this, there are two unpublished articles by Smith: 
"A Defence Of The Cosmological Argument For God's Non-Existence" (IX) 
and "The Wave Function Of A Godless Universe" (XII). Given the cost of 
the book and the accessibility of the prior publications, it seems to me that 
this is not exactly value for money. Moreover, some of the previously pub-
lished material would have benefitted from rewriting in the light of critical 
comments from other authors and reviewers; in particular, the excerpt from 
Craig's earlier book contains some quite weak arguments which could have 
been deleted or replaced without detriment to the remainder of the book. 
Finally, the utility of the book as a source of information about the physical 
and mathematical details of the relevant physical theories is somewhat less-
ened by the fact that these details are scattered through the book, rather 
than collected together in one place. 
The material in the book is organised into three sections. The first sec-
tion-about 56% of the book- presents and examines Craig's defence of 
kalam cosmological arguments-i.e. arguments with the general form: (1) 
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Everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence; (2) The universe 
began to exist; (hence) (3) The universe had a cause of its existence. The sec-
ond section-about 26% of the book-presents and examines Smith's argu-
ment that theism is inconsistent with classical Big Bang cosmology. The 
third section-about 18% of the book-examines the relative merits of 
Stephen Hawking's quantum cosmology and theism. I shall briefly discuss 
each section in tum. 
(i) The theistic cosmological argllment: 
As is well-known, Craig has defended kalam cosmological arguments 
with both a priori and II posteriori supporting arguments for the premise that 
the universe began to exist. Craig arguments have been widely discussed-
there is a partial list of references on p.92 of the book-and not all of Smith's 
critical articles are included. T shall focus my discussion upon the two main 
points of contention between Craig and Smith, and then look at two impor-
tant points upon which they agree. 
(A) The first main point of contention between Craig and Smith----debat-
ed in II and III-concerns the a priori supporting arguments: on a priori 
grounds, Craig denies that there can be physically instantiated infinities 
formed by successive addition, and, indeed, that there can be physically 
instantiated infinities at all; on similar grounds, Smith disagrees. Moreover, 
Craig thinks that it is controversial whether there are any mathematical 
infinities which are more than potentially infinite. Although Craig discusses 
the right issues, and despite the fact that there is probably a coherent posi-
tion for him to occupy, I don't think that anyone should be persuaded by 
the superficial arguments which he gives (at pp.5-35 and pp.92-107). The 
critical points which Smith makes seem to me almost all correct-indeed, 
"Infinity And The Past" strikes me as the best essay in the collection-but 
there are numerous other criticisms of Craig's discussion which I should 
also want to make. For example, to mention just four: 
(i) Craig claims that Realist interpretations of set theory are RULED OUT 
by the set-theoretic paradoxes (pp.18-20) -and yet it is well-known that 
many of those who have sought to provide new foundations for set theory 
have been Realists, e.g. Quine and Maddy. Moreover, he simply ignores the 
kinds of indispensibility arguments which have been the main tool in trade 
of mathematical Realists in recent times. And he fails to address the ques-
tion whether General Relativity and the Hawking-Penrose singularity theo-
rems-or some alternative theory of gravitation--could be reconstructed in 
non-classical, e.g. intuitionistic, mathematics; if not, then there is some ten-
sion between his appeal to the attractions of intuitionism to bolster his a pri-
ori argument, and his appeal to the consequences of observations filtered 
through the apparatus of classical mathematics, e.g. in calculations of the 
critical density of the universe, to bolster his a posteriori argument. 
(ii) Generalising the last worry raised, one might ask: if the view that the 
past universe is temporally infinite is necessarily a priori false, how can 
there be evidence which differentially supports the claim that the past uni-
verse is temporally finite? Won't anything count equally in favour of the 
claim, and nothing against it? There seems to be a general strategic problem 
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in mixing necessary a priori argument and contingent a posteriori evidence 
when supporting a particular claim, at least ignoring secondary sources of 
evidence such as testimony. Craig appears to think that his arguments 
mutually support the premise that the universe began to exist (57); but on 
current theories of evidential support with which I am acquainted-e.g. 
Bayesian theories-that would not be the case. Perhaps there is a fix involv-
ing some kind of relevant entailment, but the matter is clearly not straight-
forward. 
(iii) Craig claims that it is absurd to think that Relativity-STR and 
GTR-supports a four-dimensionalist metaphysics (25)(294££.). He suggests 
that there are three strategies which could be used to harmonise a 3D-meta-
physics with Relativity, viz: (i) distinguish between metaphysical (A-theo-
retic) time and physical (B-theoretic) time; (ii) relativise becoming to refer-
ence-frames; or (iii) select a privileged reference frame-the cosmic time of 
GTR-to define objective becoming. (95) But at least two of these strategies 
are dubious: there is no a priori guarantee that a cosmic time can be defined 
for the universe', nor that there is any other privileged reference frame 
which could serve as a suitable replacement; and the relativisation of 
becoming to reference frames entails a relativisation of existence to refer-
ence frames, which-given the local nature of frames of reference in GTR-
strongly suggests that things like existent mass-ener/)>y will not be conserved 
quantities. Moreover, the third strategy-with its proliferation of ideolo-
gy-is a concession to 4D-ism: if the views were equal in all other respects, 
then here would be a reason to prefer 4D-ism. At the very least, much more 
needs to be said to show that Relativity-STR and GTR--:ioes not support 
4D-ism. 
(iv) Craig's views about space and infinity are hard to clarify. I think his 
view must be the following: (i) finite volumes of space are only potentially 
infinitely divisible; and (ii) one cannot tell a priori whether the whole of 
space is strictly finite or rather potentially infinite, since one cannot tell a pri-
ori whether or not space is (always) expanding. However, I am not sure: this 
is one of many points which could have been clarified by a rewrite of (I). 
(B) The second main point of contention between Craig and Smith-
debated in IV, V and VI-concerns the question of whether the Big Bang 
requires a cause. Craig holds that it is a kind of "metaphysical first princi-
ple" that everything which comes to be has a cause of its coming to be (156); 
whereas Smith holds that "it is probably true that either the universe began 
without cause at the beginning of the current expansion, either (1) subse-
quent to a singularity of infinite density, temperature and curvature, and 
zero radius, or (2) at a singularity with finite and non-zero values, or (3) in a 
vacuum fluctuation from a larger space or a tunnelling from nothing, or the 
universe spontaneously began to exist at the beginning of some prior 
expansion phase under conditions described in (1), (2), or (3)" (129). I think 
there is room to disagree with both authors2; I also think that their discus-
sion proceeds with insufficient attention to the different things which one 
might mean by "cause". In particular, the discussion of whether virtual par-
ticles appear uncaused in the quantum-mechanical vacuum is marred by a 
failure to distinguish between material and efficient causes, and more gen-
erally by the absence of any serious discussion of the connections between 
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physically necessary conditions and causes.' A further problem, in evi-
dence in Craig's writing, is the tendency to use slogans-such as "nothing 
comes from nothing" -as rhetorical substitutes for arguments, e.g. against 
the view that there could be things which come to be despite the absence of 
any prior physically necessary or physically sufficient conditions for their 
coming to be. 
(C) Craig and Smith agree that the scientific evidence strongly supports 
the claim that the universe is temporally finite, and that the Big Bang singu-
larity-or some suitable quantum gravitational replacement-marks the 
temporal origin of the universe: 
(a) Craig presents a very useful, albeit now somewhat dated4, account of 
much of the astronomical observational evidence which is alleged to sup-
port the claims that the universe is expanding (red-shift of distant galaxies), 
that it expanded from a hot, dense more-or-less singular state (background 
microwave radiation, abundance of deuterium and helium), and that it will 
continue to expand forever (average density of matter). I think that he occa-
sionally slips up: for example, he says that "a neutrino is a stable atomic 
particle that has no charge and zero mass when at rest (which it never is, 
since it is travelling at the speed of light as long as it exists)" (40)-but, 
while it is true that there is no rest frame for neutrinoss, it is just not the case 
that the rest mass of particles which travel with luminal velocity is defined 
to be the mass which they (would) have when at resU More importantly, he 
sometimes draws conclusions which are not warranted by the evidence: e.g. 
from the claim that the universe will not stop expanding, he concludes that 
"creation" happened only once (76, quoting Sandage and Tammann); but, if 
Wheeler is right that laws and constants could be reprocessed probabilisti-
cally during the bounces of an oscillating universe, then other bounces 
remain an open possibility. 
(b) Smith presents a useful account of some of the theoretical considera-
tions which are alleged to support the claim that the universe began from 
something like an initial singularity-e.g. the Hawking-Penrose theorems-
together with some more impressionistic details about the underlying 
mathematics and physics. Again, I think that he sometimes slips up. For 
example, in his discussion of infinitely old oscillating universes, he writes: 
"Smith and Weingard allude to a possibility I have not considered .. ,. [They] 
do not elaborate on which model they have in mind, but [their discussion] 
brings to mind the de Sitter model of the universe." (131) In fact, I am sure 
that Smith and Weingard must have been adverting to a Robertson-Walker 
solution discussed on p.139 of Hawking and Ellis? As Hawking and Ellis 
point out, the solution in question does seem to be in conflict with observa-
tional evidence, so this oversight doesn't upset Smith's argument against 
oscillating universes. 
Smith is much more enthusiastic than Craig about recent scientific specu-
lation about the early stages of the universe, e.g. inflationary scenarios, 
grand unified theories, supersymmetry, vacuum fluctuation models, cre-
ation of dark matter, etc. As Craig rightly points out, there is as yet little or 
no evidence which supports these hypotheses; and the non-technical expla-
nations which physicists give of their content often seems to be confused-
e.g., proponents of vacuum fluctuation models often seem to get into trou-
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ble with claims about the evolution of the universe from literally nothing 
when they mean evolution from a pre-existing vacuum." However, it is also 
the case that we are very far from having a complete account of the early 
stages of the universe---€.g. we don't yet have a consistent story about the 
evolution of stars, galaxies, clusters and superclusters--so the same kind of 
methodological caution suggests that there is room for scepticism about the 
standard Big Bang model and the idea that the universe began from some-
thing like an initial singularity. Even now, it is not inconceivable-though it 
is, I grant, unlikely-that some kind of steady state theory might turn out to 
accord better with the evidence. But then it seems to me that, at the very 
least, a pro tem agnosticism about the temporal origins of the universe-and 
hence about further inferences to supernatural causes etc.-is an entirely 
respectable position. 
(D) Craig and Smith also agree in rejecting tenseless, four-dimensionalist 
accounts of time, a topic which each has discussed in other publications; 
this allows Craig to make some good criticisms of Smith's endorsement of 
physical models which appear to rely on four-dimensionalism. (153, 158f., 
259, 271) However, I doubt very much that there are any knockdown objec-
tions to 40-ism; and, in particular, I doubt that there is any good reason to 
think that 40-ers are, ipso facto, irrational. But so much of Craig's argu-
mententation-both a priori and a posteriori-relies on the premise that 40-
ism is false that it is hard to see what the point of insisting on his arguments 
could be. More generally, it is clear that Craig's arguments require numer-
ous controversial metaphysical assumptions which are at best given only 
slight support: so what point are they supposed to serve? Neither Craig nor 
Smith pays any attention to these fundamental kinds of questions, to the 
detriment of the arguments of each, I think! 
(ii) The atheistic cosmological argument: 
Smith's atheistic cosmological argument goes as follows: 
(1) If God exists and there is an earliest state E of the universe, then God 
created E. 
(2) If God created E, then E is ensured either to contain animate crea-
tures or to lead to subsequent state of the universe that contains ani-
mate creatures. 
(3) There is an earliest state of the universe and it is the Big Bang singu-
larity. 
(4) The earliest state of the universe is inanimate since the singularity 
involves the life-hostile conditions of infinite temperature, infinite 
density and infinite curvature. 
(5) The Big Bang singularity is inhererently unpredictable and lawless 
and consequently there is no guarantee that it will emit a maximal 
cor:figuration of particles that will evolve into an animate state of the 
uruverse. 
(6) (Hence) God could not have created the earliest state of the universe. 
(From 2, 3, 5, 6) 
(7) (Hence) God does not exist. (From I, 6) 
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Among the objections which Craig and Smith debate-in VII, VIII, IX, and 
X-there are the following: (i) it is not clear that God is required to create an 
animate universe; (ii) it is not clear that God cannot intervene to ensure an 
animate universe; (iii) it is not clear that the Big Bang singularity is real-
perhaps it is merely a theoretical fiction; (iv) it is not clear that unpre-
dictability entails absence of divine knowlege, since God might have middle 
knowledge; and (v) it is not clear whether the theistic hypothesis is more 
simple than the atheistic alternative. No doubt, this list of objections is 
incomplete. I think that Craig has much the better of this part of the debate, 
though sometimes his arguments could be improved upon. There do seem 
to be lots of ways of reconciling the existence of God with Big Bang cosmol-
ogy; see Duncan MacIntosh (1994) "Could God Have Made The Big Bang?" 
Dialogue 33, pp.3-20 for some suggestions. 
Craig's argument about the status of the initial singularity is curious. He 
claims that "the metaphysician is rational in interpreting the ontological sta-
tus of the singularity as nothingness" (225), by supposing that "the tempo-
ral series is like a series of fractions converging to 0 as a limit: 1/2, 1/4, 1/8, 
.... , 0" (224). While I agree that this is an excellent suggestion, it seems to 
contradict Craig's own claims about the impossibility of physically instanti-
ated infinities. Moreover, it suggests a further possibility which was over-
looked in the discussion of causes for the Big Bang: viz. that the series of 
caused events is also like the given series of fractions, and (hence?) not in 
need of any external cause. At the very least, talk about "objects popping 
into existence from nothing", etc. would seem to be quite inappropriate on 
this picture, since every event-including every event which involves an 
object coming into existence-is caused by an earlier event. 
(iii) Hawking's cosmology: 
Stephen Hawking's models for the universe provide the subject matter 
for the third major topic of debate (XI and XII). Craig alleges that the early 
Hawking-Hartle model is conceptually flawed in several respects, and, in 
particular, that it incurs various absurdly extravagant metaphyscial com-
mitments. On the other hand, Smith claims that this and subsequent models 
admit of a more modest "quasi-instrumentalist" interpretation, with none 
of the ven; extravagant commitments which Craig deplores; more exactly, 
Smith defends the following three theses: (i) a "quasi-instrumentalist" inter-
pretation of Hawking's cosmological model is physically intelligible; Oi) 
Hawking's cosmological model is inconsistent with theism; and (iii) 
Hawking's cosmological model is explanatarily superior to theism. 
One important point of contention between Craig and Smith concerns 
the consequences of the use of: a many worlds, or consistent histories, inter-
pretation of quantum mechanics; Feynman's technique of summing over 
histories; and a Euclidean configuration space, or superspace, in which time 
is imaginary. As Smith emphasises in the excellent second, third, and fourth 
sections of his essay, we need not agree with Hawking about what is 
required for a realistic interpretation of his theory-indeed, we may well be 
mislead by Hawking's speculations about the commitments entailed by 
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acceptance of his theoriO-but should look for ourselves at the technical 
details. Unfortunately, those details are so forbidding that it is hard for a 
non-specialist like me to tell whether the suggestions which Smith offers are 
plausible. 
One point which clearly requires attention is the claim that "one can 
interpret the functional integral over all compact four-geometries bounded 
by a given three-geometry as giving the amplitude for that three-geometry 
to arise .. from nothing". (313) What notion of probability is required for the 
claim that a certain wave function gives the (probability) amplitude for "the 
universe to arise from literally nothing" (313)? Should we conclude on this 
basis that there are almost certainly countless universes with the same 
geometry which also arose from nothing, not to mention myriads of uni-
verses with alternative geometries? These points are important for 
Smith's-prima facie quite implausible-arguments for the inconsistency of 
theism with Hawking's models. I strongly suspect that, on any decent 
account of probability, it is simply unintelligible to speak of the probability of 
a given three-geometry arising from nothing; at the very least, there is room 
here for elaboration and clarification. 
To conclude: I think that Craig and Smith should be commended for 
their recognition of the need for serious philosophical investigation of phys-
ical theories about the origins of the universe, and for their willingness to do 
some of the digging in the physics literature which such investigation 
requires. Much of the work to which they refer is essential reading for oth-
ers who wish to work in the field. On the other hand, I do not think that the 
decision to reprint previously published essays was correct; most of the 
essays are neither so good nor so hard to obtain as to call for re-publication 
and, in any case, the end result is far too disjointed and piecemeal to be of 
much use to readers seeking a point of entry to the field. What is really 
needed is a much more systematic examination of the bearing of recent 
philosophical work-analyses of infinity, analyses of time, analyses of cau-
sation, analyses of mathematics, analyses of the ontological status of scien-
tific theories, analyses of probability, analyses of reasoned belief revision, 
analyses of the content of theological theories, etc.--Dn the interpretation of 
those physical theories. Moreover, the physical theories themselves-and 
the evidence for them-also need to be presented more systematically. Of 
course, to do all this would be a Herculean task: but it seems to me that a 
book which falls so far short is of only dubious value. 
NOTES 
1. Or, at least, it is controversial that there is such an a priori guarantee. 
The argument of Hawking, S. (1968) "The existence of cosmic time functions" 
Proc. Roy. Soc. A 308, pp.433-435 seems to show that a necessary and sufficient 
condition for the existence of cosmic time functions in any spacetime is the 
absence of closed time-like and null curves, i.e. roughly, the absence of causal 
loops. Some hold that causal loops are a priori impossible; but the matter is con-
troversial. 
2. In particular, I think that the hypothesis of a temporally finite but 
beginingless universe-on analogy with a finite but open line segment-has 
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much to recommend it; if there is no first state of the universe, then it is far from 
clear that it is correct to say that it began, even if it is also temporally finite. 
However, I also see no good reason to think that everything which comes to be 
has a cause of its coming to be. 
3. Smith outlines a probabilitistic account of causation at pp.180-181; but 
it is subject to counter-example by well-known cases of pre-emption (Menzies) 
and double prevention (Hall). 
4. The annotations to essay I-pp.67-76-update the 1979 text. I suspect 
that Craig's discussion of the post-1979 literature exhibits certain kinds of bias-
es; e.g. I find it tempting to think that Craig's keemless to have the density para-
meter turn out to be less than one leads him to ignore the reasons which many 
cosmologists have for thinking that the density parameter must be almost exact-
ly one. More generally, I think that he lays too much stress on current failures to 
detect postulated particles and structures: dark matter, monopoles, super-
strings, etc.; it is, after all, deficiencies in the standard models which lead most 
cosmologists and particle physicists to be interested in the search for such 
things. On the other hand, there is clearly good reason to be cautious about 
these kinds of speculations. 
5. At least if neutrinos do have zero rest mass; this question has been con-
troversial of late. 
6. See, e.g., Rindler, W. (1969) Essential Reilltivity New York: Van 
Nostrand Reinhardt Company, Chapter 5, esp. p.116: "A single photon certainly 
does not [have a CM frameY'. 
7. The Large-Scale Structure Of Space- Time Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1973 
8. On the other hand, Craig himself is involved in a similar confusion 
when he claims that a condition of "infinite density" is precisely equivalent to 
"nothing" (43). 
9. r have made this kind of criticism of Craig elsewhere; see my "Reply 
To Professor Craig", Sophia, forthcoming. 
10. Smith makes a good case for the view that Craig is thus mislead. Also, 
inter Illia, he strongly suggests that my own claims about how to re-interpret 
Hawking's model-in "Professor William Craig's Criticisms Of Critiques Of 
K111am Cosmological Arguments By Paul Davies, Stephen Hawking And Adolf 
Grunbaum", forthcoming in Faith And Philosophy-are similarly confused: if 
"superspace" is a configuration space, then it is simply wrong to identify it with 
a physical space. 
Scripture in the Thought of Seren Kierkegaard, by L. Joseph Rosas, III. 
Nashville, TN: Broadman & Holman Publishers, 1994. Pp. 219. 
STEPHEN N. DUNNING, University of Pennsylvania. 
I welcome the opportunity to review Scripture in the Thought of Seren 
Kierkegaard for Faith and Philosophy, for there is no better journal in which to 
call attention to the need to pursue this neglected aspect of Kierkegaard 
studies. Although the book is seriously flawed, it does deal with an issue 
that is very important, and Dr. Rosas makes several contributions that will 
be helpful to future scholarship. 
Interpretations of the so-called "father of existentialism" have too often 
been limited to one of four trajectories: many have examined some of 
